Fidelity To Our Living Constitution by Fleming, James E.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 50 
Issue 2 Book Review 
Spring 2015 
Fidelity To Our Living Constitution 
James E. Fleming 
Boston University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James E. Fleming, Fidelity To Our Living Constitution, 50 Tulsa L. Rev. 449 (2015). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss2/20 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
50 TULSA L. REV. 449 (2015) 
449 
FIDELITY TO OUR LIVING CONSTITUTION 
James E. Fleming* 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME III: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 
(2014). Pp. 432. Hardcover $ 35.00. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, Bruce Ackerman has become increasingly dismayed about the state 
of our constitutional democracy as well as that of our constitutional theory. First came The 
Failure of the Founding Fathers in 2007.1 There followed The Decline and Fall of the 
American Republic in 2010.2 Now comes We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution in 
2014.3 Though this title does not sound as ominous as his previous ones, Ackerman decries 
the Roberts Court’s “shattering judicial betrayal” of our living constitution’s Civil Rights 
Revolution.4 Worse, he excoriates Justice Antonin Scalia’s and Justice Clarence Thomas’s 
originalism—as against his own living constitutionalism—as the “judicial battering ram 
for obliterating the achievements of the twentieth century.”5 Those were the achievements 
of We the People operating through the procedures of higher lawmaking outside the formal 
amending procedures of Article V, which Ackerman argues legitimated the New Deal and 
the Civil Rights Revolution.6 
Furthermore, Ackerman criticizes scholars and judges for their narrow conception 
of the canon of constitutional law, which fails to recognize these achievements as higher 
lawmaking changing our Constitution instead of ordinary lawmaking.7 This narrow con-
ception, he laments, reduces We the People to “Pygmies” with respect to popular sover-
eignty compared with the supposed “Giants” who walked the earth during the Founding 
and Reconstruction.8 While the legal profession “tell[s] a story of the decline and fall of 
popular sovereignty in America” in the twentieth century,9 Ackerman develops an account 
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 1. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE 
OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2007). 
 2. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010). 
 3. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME III: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION]. 
 4. Id. at 334. 
 5. Id. at 329. 
 6. Id. at 11. 
 7. Id. at 3. 
 8. Id. at 16, 311. 
 9. Id. at 19. 
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of higher lawmaking outside Article V that preserves the very possibility of popular sov-
ereignty in our time.10 
What remedies does Ackerman propose? He argues for a broader conception of the 
constitutional canon: the higher law of the Constitution includes not only formally adopted 
provisions but also “landmark statutes” and judicial “superprecedents,” such as those of 
the New Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution.11 He also argues for a broader conception 
of popular sovereignty: We the People manifest our will not only through the formal 
amending procedures but also through the higher lawmaking procedures outside Article V 
that he elaborates.12 He puts forward and substantiates six phases of higher lawmaking as 
having operated in the New Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution: (1) signaling (that con-
sideration of constitutional change is underway), (2) proposal, (3) triggering election, (4) 
mobilized elaboration, (5) ratifying election, and (6) consolidation.13 He wants to establish 
the Civil Rights Revolution as a constitutional revolution—not merely some ordinary, 
though important, legislative and judicial developments.14 The upshot would be that the 
landmark statutes and judicial superprecedents of the Civil Rights Revolution may not be 
repealed or “erased” by ordinary lawmaking or ordinary judicial decisions.15 Instead, re-
pudiating its core changes and commitments would require going through the elaborate 
six-phase process of higher lawmaking. If we fail to adopt his account, we risk forsaking 
fidelity to our living constitution and getting lost in an originalist “fog of ancestor wor-
ship.”16 
We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution is a magisterial and magnificent third 
volume of Ackerman’s We the People project, which began with Volume I: Foundations 
in 1991,17 followed by Volume II: Transformations in 1998,18 and will be continued by 
Volume IV: Interpretations in the future.19 I can imagine three general tacks in reviewing 
Ackerman’s book. One would be to assess his account of the Civil Rights Revolution itself: 
What does he contribute to our understanding of its animating principles, the legacy of 
Brown v. Board of Education,20 the relationship between courts, legislatures, executives, 
and social movements in bringing about constitutional and social change, and the like? A 
second would be to analyze the constitutional theory and framework for constitutional 
change put forward in Volume III in relation to that already advanced in Volume 1: Foun-
dations and Volume II: Transformations: How is Ackerman’s theory as a whole playing 
out, has he refined it for the better, does he deliver on the promises or remedy the short-
comings of previous volumes, and so on? A third tack would be to relate Ackerman’s 
                                                          
 10. See id. at 16-17, 19. 
 11. Id. at 32-36. 
 12. Id. at 8-9. 
 13. Id. at 44-46. 
 14. Id. at 6-7. 
 15. Id. at 19, 328-37. 
 16. Id. at 340. 
 17.  BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME I: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, 
FOUNDATIONS]. 
 18.  BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME II: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, 
TRANSFORMATIONS]. 
 19. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 336 (referring to projected Volume IV, WE 
THE PEOPLE: INTERPRETATIONS). 
 20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
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theory to the state of constitutional theory today, including the debates between original-
ism and living constitutionalism concerning fidelity and change. I imagine that most re-
viewers will take the first tack (as do most of the contributors to the Yale Law Journal 
symposium on the book and Sidney Tarrow’s essay in this issue).21 I shall take the third, 
though not without some observations bearing on the first and second. 
Ackerman offers stinging criticisms of conventional forms of originalism. And he 
makes cogent advances over previous versions of living constitutionalism. Most im-
portantly, he exhorts us to fidelity to our living constitution: to preserve and extend the 
commitments “hammered out” through the processes of popular sovereignty during the 
Civil Rights Revolution: for example, the anti-humiliation principle of Brown, narrowing 
the state action requirement, pruning back of state autonomy limits on national power in 
order to protect fundamental rights like voting, and the expansion of the commerce power 
to promote national goods.22 He also scolds originalists who reject those commitments—
such as Scalia, Thomas, and the Roberts Court more generally—for their “erasure” of the 
achievements of the Civil Rights Revolution23or their “shattering judicial betrayal” of We 
the People’s products of popular sovereignty24: constitutional changes wrought by the Su-
preme Court, President, and Congress working through a collaborative constitutionalism 
(or coordinate constitutionalism) to secure equal citizenship for all.25 
This essay is part of my forthcoming book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution,26 
in which I reject all forms of originalism and recast the best forms of living constitution-
alism. Instead, I defend what Ronald Dworkin has called a “moral reading” of the Consti-
tution27 and what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a “philosophic approach” to consti-
tutional interpretation.28 By “moral reading” and “philosophic approach,” I refer to 
conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles—not 
codifying concrete historical rules or practices—and of interpretation of those principles 
as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood—not merely histor-
ical research to discover relatively specific original meanings. I argue that the moral read-
ing, not any version of originalism or living constitutionalism, is the most faithful to the 
Constitution’s commitments. 
Below I shall interpret or reconstruct Ackerman’s living constitutionalism as a moral 
reading of the Constitution. Ackerman’s theory is more grounded in fit with our constitu-
tional history and practice, and more rooted in popular sovereignty, than Dworkin’s own 
moral reading. But Ackerman’s is nonetheless a moral reading in which faithful interpre-
tation requires normative judgments about the best understanding of our constitutional 
commitments as we have built them out over time. Ackerman’s theory is also a moral 
                                                          
 21. Sidney Tarrow, The People Maybe? Opening The Civil Rights Revolution to Social Movements, 50 
TULSA L. REV. 415 (2015). 
 22. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 10, 328. 
 23. Id. at 328-35. 
 24. Id. at 334. 
 25. Id. at 107-09, 152, 162, 320-21; see also id. at 4-5, 9, 11, 312. 
 26. JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2015). 
 27. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2-3 
(1996).  
 28. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 
xiii, 155 (2007).  
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reading in the sense that he believes it is necessary to adopt and apply it in order to make 
the Constitution the best it can be (to recall Dworkin’s famous formulation)29 or redeem 
its promises (to invoke Jack Balkin’s formulation).30 
I. ACKERMAN’S CONCEPTION OF FIDELITY AS QUESTING FOR INTERGENERATIONAL 
SYNTHESIS AND HONORING OUR LIVING CONSTITUTION 
In Foundations and Transformations, Ackerman developed his well-known theory 
of constitutional change outside the formal amending procedures of Article V. He exhorted 
us to break up the monopoly that Article V of the Constitution has held on our vision of 
constitutional amendment. He urged us to move “beyond Article V” and to embrace a 
pluralist understanding of the sources of higher lawmaking.31 Only by doing so, he argued, 
will we be able to comprehend the processes of unconventional adaptation outside Article 
V whereby We the People have transformed the Constitution through the Founding, Re-
construction, and New Deal. Nothing less, Ackerman admonished us, will preserve and 
realize both “the possibility of popular sovereignty” and “the possibility of interpretation” 
under our Constitution.32 In developing this theory of constitutional change, he implicitly 
elaborated a theory of constitutional fidelity. In putting forward this theory of fidelity and 
change, Ackerman has tried to answer the most common objections to living constitution-
alism: (1) that it is not faithful to the Constitution; (2) that it is undemocratic in the sense 
that it involves “judicial updating” of the Constitution in derogation of popular sover-
eignty; and (3) that it entrusts judges with a responsibility that is not interpretation, but 
rather updating or improving. 
Conventional originalists such as Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia have asserted a 
monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation, claiming that fidelity re-
quires following the rules laid down by, or giving effect to the relatively specific original 
understandings or meanings of, the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution.33 Bork and 
Scalia said that the originalists are the ones who care about fidelity in constitutional inter-
pretation, and all those other folks – the “revisionists” and “non-originalists”—do not.34 
In 1996, I co-organized a symposium at Fordham on “Fidelity in Constitutional The-
ory.”35 One aim of the symposium was to challenge the conventional originalists’ claim to 
a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation. It did so by featuring 
several competing conceptions of fidelity that were decidedly not conventional originalist 
conceptions: (1) Dworkin’s understanding of fidelity as pursuing integrity with the moral 
reading of the Constitution;36 (2) Ackerman’s understanding of fidelity as questing for 
                                                          
 29. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255 (1986). 
 30. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 74-99 (2011). 
 31. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 58-80; ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 18, at 
15-17. 
 32. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 131-62; ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 18, 
at 119. 
 33. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143 (1990); 
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854, 862-63 (1989). 
 34. BORK, supra note 33, at 187-240; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 37-47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Scalia, supra note 33, at 852-56, 862-64. 
 35. Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 (1997). 
 36. DWORKIN, supra note 27, at 73-76; RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT 
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“intergenerational synthesis” across the three constitutional regimes or moments of the 
Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal;37 (3) Lawrence Lessig’s understanding of 
fidelity as translation across generations;38 (4) Jack Rakove’s understanding of fidelity as 
keeping faith with the founders’ vision;39 and (5) an early formulation of Jack Balkin’s 
conception that ultimately became his method of text and principle, with its argument for 
fidelity to abstract original public meaning.40 At the time, I observed that Ackerman, Les-
sig, and Balkin had taken the tack of attempting to beat conventional originalists at their 
own game: they advanced fidelity as synthesis, fidelity as translation, and the method of 
text and principle as broad, abstract, or “living” forms of originalism that were superior—
as conceptions of originalism—to conventional originalism.41 
In this essay, I shall assess the progress that Ackerman has made in this project of 
developing a conception of fidelity that is superior to those of conventional originalists. 
Again, Ackerman urges us to aspire to fidelity to our living Constitution. On his view, 
originalists who urge fidelity to the original meanings of the Constitution of 1787 (the 
Founding) or even those of 1868 (Reconstruction) are betraying our living Constitution.42 
We need not only to quest for “intergenerational synthesis” with the past constitutional 
moments or regimes,43 but also to “honor” the fundamental changes that have occurred or 
are occurring outside Article V through the procedures of popular sovereignty, most nota-
bly, the Civil Rights Revolution or Second Reconstruction.44 Thus does he attempt to turn 
the tables—the tables of fidelity—upon the conventional originalists. He paints them with 
the vices of betrayal, erasure, or rewriting—the very vices with which they typically tar 
living constitutionalists. 
The aspiration to fidelity, as I have argued elsewhere,45 raises two fundamental ques-
tions: (1) Fidelity to what? and (2) What is fidelity? The short answer to the first—fidelity 
to the Constitution—poses a further question: What is the Constitution? The short answer 
                                                          
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 125-29 (1993); Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of 
Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1997).  
 37. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 88-89, 159-62 (developing an understanding of fidelity 
as questing “multigenerational synthesis” or “interpretive synthesis” across the three constitutional regimes or 
moments of the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal); Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1519-20 (1997) (advancing his conception of fidelity as pursuing intergenerational 
synthesis). 
 38. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1367-68, 1371-76 (1997) 
(arguing for an understanding of fidelity as “grounded in a practice of translation”); see also Lawrence Lessig, 
Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1263-64 (1993) (arguing for a conception of fidelity as translation). 
 39. See Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1605-09 (1997) 
(discussing “fidelity to history” and its superiority to originalism, which is a kind of “fidelity through history”); 
see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
3-22 (1996) (discussing the “perils” of conventional originalism). 
 40. See Jack M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 
1708-09 (1997) (distinguishing between fidelity to the “true Constitution or the best interpretation of the Consti-
tution [and] its various historical interpretations and manifestations”). Balkin subsequently reworked and incor-
porated this piece in JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 
103-38 (2011), the companion book to BALKIN, supra note 30, at 3-5 (arguing for fidelity to abstract text and 
principle). 
 41. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1997). 
 42. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 311-40. 
 43. Id. at 336. 
 44. Id. at 81. 
 45. Fleming, supra note 41, at 1335. 
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to the second—being faithful to the Constitution in interpreting it—leads to another ques-
tion: How should the Constitution be interpreted? Ackerman recognizes that these ques-
tions of What and How are the central questions of constitutional fidelity. He writes: “Once 
we get clearer about what we should be interpreting, the debate over how to interpret the 
canon will take a different shape.”46 Ackerman argues that we need “to build a [broader] 
canon . . . based on the truth of the entire American experience.”47 Again, it would include 
not only the formally adopted provisions, but also landmark statutes and judicial super-
precedents. He suggests that broadening the canon promises to break the “impasse over 
interpretation” between originalists and living constitutionalists.48 He goes so far as to say 
that a redefined canon “would create . . . strange allies in the ongoing conversation that is 
our Constitution.”49 Or, that adversaries “at least would be talking to one another.”50 
This formulation seems to presuppose that the impasse between originalists and liv-
ing constitutionalists concerns how to interpret the Constitution, and that introducing a 
broader conception of what the Constitution is will break that impasse. I am not so hopeful. 
Contrary to Ackerman, I believe that the basic disagreements between these views are as 
much over the question what is the Constitution as over the question how to interpret it. 
Originalism is one conception of what the constitutional canon includes. Living constitu-
tionalism is a fundamentally different conception. For this reason, originalists are going to 
resist his attempt to “build a [broader] canon . . .  based on the truth of the entire American 
experience.”51 They are going to deny that what Ackerman views as landmark statutes and 
superprecedents are part of the canon of constitutional law. Indeed, they are going to argue 
that much of the experience Ackerman celebrates as the great achievements of the New 
Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution is at best constitutionally gratuitous, or at worst con-
stitutionally forbidden. The majority opinion in Shelby County (Voting Rights Act) and 
the dissents in Sebelius (Affordable Care Act) and Windsor (Defense of Marriage Act) are 
proof of that.52 Such originalists are going to resist “talking to” the living constitutionalists 
like Ackerman, if you will. 
Relatedly, at one point, Ackerman suggests that his disagreement with Scalia is not 
over originalism, but over the constitutional canon and Article V exclusivity.53 But Scalia-
style originalism is a conception of Article V exclusivity—a conception of what the Con-
stitution is. Hence, Ackerman’s disagreement with Scalia over Article V exclusivity is a 
disagreement over originalism. 
II. IS ACKERMAN AN ORIGINALIST OR A LIVING CONSTITUTIONALIST? 
In thinking about fidelity and change in constitutional interpretation, many have 
                                                          
 46. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 36. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 35.  
 49. Id. at 36.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 309-10, 330, 335 (discussing Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)); id. at 27, & 343 n.3 
(discussing dissent in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); id. at 308-09 (discussing 
dissent in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 53. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 329. 
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framed the basic choice as being between originalism and living constitutionalism. This 
formulation puts originalism on the side of fidelity and living constitutionalism on the side 
of change. In this vein, we might ask, “Is Ackerman an originalist, or a living constitution-
alist?” We also might ask whether his theory is an advance over available versions of 
originalism or living constitutionalism? 
It would seem that Ackerman is a proud, avowed living constitutionalist. After all, 
he titled his Holmes Lectures—which he reworks in Chapters 1-4 of The Civil Rights Rev-
olution—“The Living Constitution.”54 He painstakingly develops a conception of the liv-
ing constitution, with six phases for constitutional amendment outside the formal proce-
dures of Article V. Furthermore, a recurring refrain throughout the Lectures and the book 
is to celebrate the dynamics of the higher lawmaking system and the commitments of liv-
ing constitutionalism hammered out over time by the Supreme Court in collaboration with 
the President and Congress. 
What is more, Ackerman is second to none in blasting Scalia’s and Thomas’s 
originalism as a “judicial battering ram [against] the achievements of the twentieth cen-
tury,” including the New Deal and Civil Rights Revolution55—the achievements, that is, 
of the living constitution as Ackerman conceives it. Furthermore, he warns against betrayal 
of the living constitution through getting lost in the “fog of ancestor worship.”56 He also 
chastises originalists for their assumption that constitutional creativity and change—higher 
lawmaking—was done by the “Giants” at the Founding and Reconstruction, and that We 
the People have been “Pygmies” ever since, not accomplishing much rising to the level of 
higher lawmaking.57 More generally, he castigates the originalists like Scalia and Thomas 
and the Roberts Court more generally for trying to erase or betray the achievements of the 
New Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution, the greatest achievements of our system of 
popular sovereignty/higher lawmaking outside the formal procedures of Article V.58 
Yet, Ackerman says at the end of his book: “I am the originalist, not [Scalia or 
Thomas].”59 In prior work, I have noted that some have asked, “Are We All Originalists 
Now?”60 Many have answered “Yes.”61 If anything would support that answer, it would 
be living constitutionalists like Ackerman clothing their theories in the garb of originalism. 
Or claiming to be “the [real] originalist.”62 For 329 pages, Ackerman had demonstrated 
the development of a living constitution. At every turn, he had shown that the Civil Rights 
Revolution was not built from originalism (whether through a quest for fidelity to the orig-
inal meanings of the Founding or to those of Reconstruction). And he had criticized 
originalists for erasing the achievements of the living constitution: what We the People 
have hammered out through the procedures of popular sovereignty outside Article V. 
                                                          
 54. Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1737 (2007). 
 55. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 329. 
 56. Id. at 340. 
 57. Id. at 16, 311. 
 58. Id. at 19, 328-37.  
 59. Id. at 329. 
 60. James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1785, 1786 (2013). 
 61. See, e.g., ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 3 
(2011).  
 62. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 329. 
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Moreover, he had applauded the leading cases of the Civil Rights Revolution—e.g., Brown 
and Loving v. Virginia—for being avowedly anti-originalist.63 Finally, he went on to argue 
that “the Constitution is a work of many generations,”64 not just the Founding or Recon-
struction generations. 
Thus, Ackerman sounds a false note when he says: “I am the originalist, not [Scalia 
or Thomas].” He certainly is not a conventional originalist. His scorn for the originalism 
of Scalia and Thomas—“who are at war with the twentieth century”65 and who accordingly 
would erase or obliterate the great achievements of our constitutional practice of popular 
sovereignly—matches that of moral readers like Dworkin and me. I have two further ob-
servations about Ackerman’s discordant bow to originalism. One, these moves show the 
grip of what I have called the “originalist premise” on the minds of even the most anti-
originalist and most avowed living constitutionalists: the premise or assumption that the 
only way to profess fidelity to the Constitution, rather than to betray it, is through original-
ism, if only we could articulate the best or “real” form of originalism.66 Two, the better 
way to put this point is simply for Ackerman to say that he is more faithful to the Consti-
tution, properly understood as (1) including the constitutional commitments we have “built 
out” (as Balkin says)67 or “hammered out” (in Ackerman’s formulation)68 through our 
practice of living constitutionalism (which originalists reject), rather than as (2) including 
merely the relatively specific original meanings and expectations of the framers and rati-
fiers (which originalists insist exhausts the constitutional canon). 
To recapitulate: Ackerman is developing a living constitutionalism—with a broader 
canon,69 as he says, or a broader conception of what and how, as I would put it, than con-
ventional originalists hold. He is also claiming to be more faithful to the Constitution 
(rightly understood as including the landmark statutes and superprecedents like those of 
the New Deal and Civil Rights Revolution) than they are. The originalists would say that 
we have an obligation to be faithful to the original meanings of the Constitution, and thus 
to erase any statutes or precedents that purport to have changed those meanings: to wit, 
the very achievements celebrated by Ackerman’s living constitutionalism. 
III. ACKERMAN’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TRADITION OF LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 
To this point, I have argued that Ackerman is better understood as a living constitu-
tionalist, not an originalist. Next I shall ask, what does he contribute to the tradition of 
living constitutionalism? I hasten to observe that living constitutionalism today is not your 
mother or father’s living constitutionalism. Once upon a time, “the living constitution” 
was a hackneyed idea. Proponents of living constitutionalism characteristically were prag-
matic, instrumentalist, and forward-looking in their approach to constitutional interpreta-
                                                          
 63. Id. at 129 (discussing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); id. at 300-01 (discussing Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
 64. Id. at 336. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Fleming, supra note 60, at 1795. 
 67. BALKIN, supra note 30, at 3. 
 68. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 10, 328. 
 69. Id. at 36. 
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tion and, as such, tended to be anti-fidelity. Though, truth be told, most living constitu-
tionalists who supposedly think this way are fabrications created in the minds of original-
ists like Chief Justice Rehnquist (see his “The Notion of a Living Constitution”)70 and 
Justice Scalia (see his discussion of “the Living Constitution” in his A Matter of Interpre-
tation: Federal Courts and the Law).71 
Disparaging the tradition of living constitutionalism as a mess, Scalia wrote in 
“Originalism: The Lesser Evil” in 1989 that the only thing the motley group of living 
constitutionalists can agree upon is their rejection of originalism.72 But, he continued: 
“You can’t beat somebody with nobody.”73 Or, as others have put it: “It takes a theory to 
beat a theory.”74 He asserted that living constitutionalism is not a viable theory to beat 
originalism (in whatever form). Furthermore, originalists—like Bork and Scalia (and, 
more recently, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport)75—criticize hackneyed versions 
of living constitutionalism as nothing more than “judicial updating” of the Constitution, 
an illegitimate alternative to the legitimate method for constitutional change through the 
formal procedures of Article V. They object: (1) that such living constitutionalism does 
not involve judicial “interpretation” (but updating) and (2) that it is not consistent with 
popular sovereignty (but is a judicial end-run around Article V’s requirements for the ex-
pression of popular sovereignty through formal constitutional amendments). 
I am a longstanding critic of both originalism and living constitutionalism.76 But I 
want fairly to assess the state of living constitutionalism today. Living constitutionalism 
is far more sophisticated today than it was when Scalia wrote in 1989. David Strauss and 
Bruce Ackerman have given living constitutionalism far more defensible formulations that 
respond to the two criticisms noted above: (1) Strauss assimilates it to ordinary common 
law interpretation and (2) Ackerman shows it to be a practice of popular sovereignty. 
Strauss has framed living constitutionalism as a common law constitutional inter-
pretation rather than simply a forward-looking program for changing or updating the Con-
stitution.77 He convincingly shows the extent to which: (1) common law constitutional 
interpretation, rather than originalism, has been our practice; (2) common law constitu-
tional interpretation provides better constraints upon judicial decision making than does 
originalism; and (3) common law constitutional interpretation, rather than the formal pro-
cedures of Article V, has been our procedure for change.78 He gives living constitutional-
ism a grounding, rigor, and structure that it previously lacked. 
Ackerman also has developed a form of living constitutionalism that is a compelling 
alternative to originalism. Most importantly, his account of the living constitution is not 
court-centered, but is “regime-centered.” He constructs an understanding of constitutional 
change through a collaborative constitutionalism engaging not only the Supreme Court but 
                                                          
 70. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976). 
 71. SCALIA, supra note 34, at 37-48. 
 72. Scalia, supra note 33, at 855. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See, e.g., BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 61, at 73-74. 
 75. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 81-82, 
100-01 (2013). 
 76. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Change, and the Good Constitution, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 515 (2014).  
 77. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
 78. Id. at 33-49, 77-92, 115-39. 
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also the President and Congress in hammering out our constitutional commitments in the 
regimes of the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal—and now the Civil Rights 
Revolution.79 As such, Ackerman’s theory offers an effective retort to originalist com-
plaints about living constitutionalism as being nothing more than “judicial updating” of 
the Constitution. Also, he develops an account of popular sovereignty that is superior to 
that of the originalists. He shows that the New Deal-Civil Rights Regime’s constitutional 
practice is not problematically undemocratic: it is not a violation of popular sovereignty 
but a fulfillment of it! Ackerman emphasizes the popular sovereignty credentials of living 
constitutionalist higher lawmaking. Indeed, he presents Article V as an archaic method of 
higher lawmaking, inferior in popular sovereignty credentials to the “modern” collabora-
tive model of higher lawmaking engaging the President, Congress, and Supreme Court 
working together.80 
Needless to say, Scalia (not to mention McGinnis and Rappaport) would deny that 
what Ackerman describes is higher lawmaking. They likely would reduce all of these 
“landmark statutes” and “superprecedents” to (1) ordinary lawmaking and (2) judicial up-
dating. They would argue that the Supreme Court is justified in rejecting much of what 
Ackerman regards as the great achievements of the New Deal and Civil Rights Movement, 
made in the name of We the People, as unconstitutional. Ironically, those who object to 
“judicial updating” of the Constitution and “judicial activism” are in this respect the most 
court-centered and most “judicial activist” of all—the originalists who would have courts 
throw out what Ackerman celebrates as the achievements of popular sovereignty in the 
name of their formal, court-centered understanding of the constitutional canon and of fi-
delity versus change. 
I want to observe a similarity between Strauss’s and Ackerman’s versions of living 
constitutionalism and then some differences. The major similarity is that both downplay 
the relevance of formal constitutional amendments in their accounts of constitutional 
change.81 But they differ in their conceptions of the engines of change. Strauss presents 
living constitutionalism as common law constitutional interpretation by judges. When 
McGinnis and Rappaport decry “judicial updating” of the Constitution, they presumably 
have versions of living constitutionalism like Strauss’s in mind. 
Ackerman’s living constitutionalism, by contrast, is emphatically not a court-cen-
tered model of “judicial updating” of the Constitution. His collaborative model shows the 
dialogue of construction between the Supreme Court, on the one hand, and the President 
and Congress (and ultimately the people), on the other.82 Through the arduous six phases 
of higher lawmaking, his theory claims the authority to speak in the name of We the Peo-
ple. It claims to be the expression of popular sovereignty, not judicial supremacy.83 For 
this reason, Ackerman’s theory of living constitutionalism may have advantages over 
Strauss’s theory. Ackerman’s view provides an antidote not only to court-centeredness but 
also to idolatry of the Warren Court: The heroes of his story of the Civil Rights Revolution 
                                                          
 79. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 2. 
 80. Id. at 62-63. 
 81. Compare id. at 10-11, 333, with STRAUSS, supra note 77, at 115-39. 
 82. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 107-09, 152, 162, 320-21; see also id. at 4-5, 
9, 11, 312 (discussing or illustrating Ackerman’s collaborative model).  
 83. Id. at 317. 
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are Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon (it turns out that Neil Young was right, 
“even Richard Nixon has got soul”),84 Martin Luther King, Jr., and Senator Everett 
Dirksen, and he exposes the conservatism of the Warren Court.85 
Other proponents of a living constitution have argued that the Supreme Court is not 
as “counter-majoritarian” as sometimes feared, but rather stays in touch with “the will of 
the people,” to invoke the title of Barry Friedman’s well-known book.86 But unlike Fried-
man, who does not give an adequate account of how the will of the people actually gets 
expressed in constitutional law, Ackerman articulates and substantiates a six-step frame-
work through which constitutional changes occur and shows how the will of We the People 
comes to be expressed in the canon of constitutional law.87 Through Ackerman’s living 
constitutionalism, it is plausible to say that We the People have proposed and ratified the 
constitutional changes, and that those changes are not just judicial updating of the Consti-
tution (not even judicial updating with an ear to the ground concerning the will of the 
people). 
Furthermore, Ackerman and Strauss have different views concerning why formal 
constitutional amendments are largely irrelevant in our practice of constitutional change. 
For Strauss, amendments are not relevant because the Constitution already contains gen-
eral principles that courts can elaborate over time through common law constitutional in-
terpretation.88 The Constitution, properly interpreted, already contains the principles that 
have been the subject of formally adopted amendments like the Twenty-Fourth’s abolition 
of the poll tax in federal elections and of formally proposed amendments like the Equal 
Rights Amendment. We do not need these amendments because we already have the gen-
eral constitutional commitment to equal protection. 
For Ackerman, by contrast, the irrelevance of constitutional amendments stems from 
our modern practice of popular sovereignty. Changes come about through the six-step 
higher lawmaking process in the name of We the People. Ackerman actually goes so far 
as to claim that changes brought about through this process have superior democratic cre-
dentials to Article V amendments. He is at pains to argue that what he calls the modern 
separation of powers model—of collaborative constitutionalism among the Supreme 
Court, President, and Congress in hammering out our constitutional commitments—is su-
perior to what he calls Article V’s archaic federalism model—requiring ratification by 
three-fourths of the states.89 Strauss, unlike Ackerman, labors under no compulsion to 
frame the changes of living constitutionalism as having been brought about through pop-
ular sovereignty or in the name of We the People. 
Finally, Ackerman’s and Strauss’s versions of living constitutionalism differ funda-
mentally in their attitudes toward fidelity in constitutional interpretation. Living constitu-
tionalists traditionally have not made fidelity a virtue. They have celebrated change. In 
this spirit, Strauss is dubious about the aspiration to fidelity.90 Ackerman, like Balkin, is 
                                                          
 84. Neil Young, Campaigner, on DECADE (Warner Reprise, 1977). 
 85. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 83-104, 295-300. 
 86. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009). 
 87. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3. 
 88. STRAUSS, supra note 77, at 115-39. 
 89. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 4-5, 9, 11, 311-12. 
 90. STRAUSS, supra note 77, at 24. 
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quite different. Both stress the virtue of fidelity.91 They recognize that living constitution-
alists should not forfeit the contest over fidelity to the originalists but rather should develop 
alternative, superior conceptions of fidelity. Balkin argues that we should quest for fidelity 
to the original meanings abstractly conceived—the abstract moral principles of the Con-
stitution, not the relatively specific original meanings and expectations of the framers and 
ratifiers. He conceives fidelity as redemption of the promises of our abstract constitutional 
commitments.92 By contrast, Ackerman contends that we should maintain fidelity to our 
living constitution (to recall my title). Again, he faults Scalia, Thomas, and the Roberts 
Court generally for their betrayal and erasure of the achievements of the New Deal and the 
Civil Rights Revolution. Ackerman contends that these changes may not be undone legit-
imately through ordinary lawmaking and ordinary judicial decisions. 
On the one hand, Ackerman grants that constitutional change should be hard—it is 
not ordinary lawmaking— but contends that it should not be hard in the way that Article 
V, with its federalism model, makes it.93 Instead, it should be hard in the sense that it must 
pass through his six-stage process, as the New Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution have 
done.94 On the other hand, he suggests that constitutional change to repeal the New Deal 
or Civil Rights Revolution should be harder than erasure or betrayal by ordinary lawmak-
ing or ordinary judicial decisions by the Roberts Court (without going through the six-step 
process).95 
In sum, Ackerman’s theory of living constitutionalism is superior to hackneyed ver-
sions of living constitutionalism as well as to originalism. 
IV. DO WE NEED ACKERMAN’S FRAMEWORK OF LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM/HIGHER 
LAWMAKING? 
I can imagine a sympathetic reader saying, “Yes, Ackerman’s account of the princi-
ples of the New Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution is compelling. It is just that we do 
not need his complex six-phase apparatus of higher lawmaking outside the formal amend-
ing procedures of Article V to justify and articulate these principles. We can just reframe 
his analysis as a compelling account of the interpretation, construction, and redemption of 
the abstract constitutional commitments of the Fourteenth Amendment, together with 
those of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. I can imagine Dworkin taking this 
view. Balkin basically takes this view.96 I can also imagine Strauss doing so. I took this 
view in prior work on Ackerman’s previous two volumes.97 
                                                          
 91. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 13, 335-37; BALKIN, supra note 30, at 3-20. 
 92. BALKIN, supra note 30, at 21-34, 74-99. 
 93. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 28. 
 94. Id. at 44-46. 
 95. To be sure, Ackerman does say that he has “no interest in constructing a constitutional canon for eternity,” 
and he concedes that “the leading principles of the civil rights legislation could be repealed by a simple majority 
of Congress if supported by the President.” Id. at 80-81. But he argues that: “We the Judges do not have consti-
tutional authority to erase the considered judgments of We the People.” Id. at 317 (emphases omitted). He also 
contends that the “New Deal-Civil Rights regime . . . plac[ed] a bipartisan seal of approval on the fundamental 
principles expressed by the landmark statutes of the new order and put[] their repeal beyond the pale of political 
possibility.” Id. at 49.  
 96. BALKIN, supra note 30, at 309-12 (discussing differences between his theory and Ackerman’s). 
 97. James E. Fleming, We the Exceptional American People, 11 CONST. COMMENT 355 (1994); James E. 
Fleming, We the Unconventional American People, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1998).  
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Ackerman likely would view this way of putting things as too court-centered. He 
wants to insist that his theory instead stems from a collaborative model of the Supreme 
Court working with the President and Congress to hammer out a Second Reconstruction 
in the name of We the People. And so, he would insist that we do need his apparatus, not 
just elaboration of a moral reading of the Constitution as embodying abstract commitments 
to equal protection and the like. 
But I have a number of responses. One, a moral reading like that of Dworkin or 
Balkin does not exclude Congress and the President from taking the Constitution seriously 
outside the Courts. A moral reading is not inherently court-loving or legislature-disparag-
ing (irrespective of what Dworkin may have said on occasion to encourage that view).98 
Two, relatedly, a moral reading does not preclude what Balkin calls “construction” (or 
“building out” the commitments of the Constitution)99 or indeed what Ackerman calls a 
collaborative model of the President and Congress working together with the Supreme 
Court in hammering out our commitments.100 Three, Ackerman speaks of “redeeming” our 
constitutional commitments.101 That sounds like the Constitution already embodies ab-
stract commitments to principles such as equal protection that have to be hammered out or 
built out over time. Even on Ackerman’s account, it seems like the Civil Rights Revolution 
or Second Reconstruction is redeeming or realizing the aspirations of the First Reconstruc-
tion. Dworkin and I would say that we are working out a better understanding of our com-
mitments to equal protection, and Balkin would say that we are redeeming its promises. 
These formulations bespeak moral readings of the Constitution. Ackerman, in offering his 
complex framework of popular sovereignty, is insisting that We the People have changed 
our constitutional commitments through the Civil Rights Revolution and that we now 
should be faithful to or honor those changed commitments. 
What is the difference between these formulations? What turns on the difference? 
Ackerman wants to present the Civil Rights Revolution as a product of popular sover-
eignty—We the People—not as a product of judicial elaboration of constitutional commit-
ments  by We the Judges. And not as an exercise in political philosophy in the seminar 
room or in the courts (as the “forum of principle”).102 Ackerman wants to deny that our 
constitutional commitments were all there in the original meanings of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from the beginning—as the work of the “Giants” who walked the earth during 
the First Reconstruction in the nineteenth century.103 He wants to insist that popular sov-
ereignty has not “perish[ed] from the face of the earth,” to invoke Lincoln,104 but has 
thrived in the twentieth century’s New Deal and Civil Rights Revolution. 
Thus, Ackerman wants to show that popular sovereignty is alive and well. It oper-
ates, not as originalists like Scalia contemplate, in ordinary lawmaking concerning things 
                                                          
 98. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, in RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33 
(1985). 
 99. BALKIN, supra note 30, at 3. 
 100. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 107-09, 152, 162, 320-21; see also id. at 4-5, 
9, 11, 312. 
 101. Id. at 43, 198, 312, 337. 
 102. Id. at 160, 170. 
 103. Id. at 16, 311. 
 104. Cf. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg (Nov. 19, 
1863), in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 17, 23 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
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the Constitution “says nothing about” or leaves open,105 but instead in the very process of 
working out our deepest constitutional commitments, as higher lawmaking in the name of 
We the People. When it comes to higher lawmaking in our time, We the People are not the 
“Pygmies” to which the originalists would reduce us.106 
And so, Ackerman would retort, yes, we do need his framework of living constitu-
tionalism/higher lawmaking. We need it to protect us against betrayal and erasure: for we 
can argue that we really have amended the Constitution, and now we should be faithful to 
that changed Constitution, not just the Founding Constitution or the Reconstruction Con-
stitution. But will his understanding really protect us against such betrayal or erasure? 
As Ackerman frames the matter, the originalist enemies of the achievements of the 
twentieth century do not understand our constitutional practice: that we have a broad con-
stitutional canon and that through a collaborative constitutionalism the Supreme Court, 
President, and Congress have achieved in the Civil Rights Revolution the functional equiv-
alent of a constitutional amendment in the name of We the People. Because of this failure 
of understanding, the originalists decry the achievements of our constitutional practice as 
illegitimate “judicial updating” of the Constitution. 
But as I see the matter, these originalists reject Ackerman’s understanding of our 
constitutional practice and his broad understanding of the constitutional canon. They view 
what he sees as achievements as instead “rot” or “rewriting.”107 I daresay that the main 
reason is that they have a different moral reading, a different substantive vision of our 
Constitution. They are going to fight for their substantive vision no matter what Ackerman 
shows us about our actual constitutional practice. 
In sum, we have a constitutional war going on: a war of competing substantive vi-
sions of the Constitution. What Ackerman sees as fidelity to our living constitution, con-
servative originalists see as infidelity to the Constitution, more narrowly conceived as what 
they hold to be its original meanings. What Ackerman sees as realizing our constitutional 
commitments—the great achievements of the twentieth century—they see as rewriting, 
repudiating, or destroying them. What Ackerman thinks We the People have repudiated 
through the New Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution (for example, the older understand-
ings of federalism, the commerce power, state action, and the like), they think We the 
Judges must restore. And so it goes, on and on, without end. Ackerman’s living constitu-
tionalism will not resolve the “impasse” between originalism and living constitutionalism, 
and will not usher in a new era in which originalists and living constitutionalists are “talk-
ing to” one another. 
Finally, I want to address Ackerman’s implicit claim that his living constitution—
with its account of the great achievements of the Civil Rights Revolution as having 
amended the Constitution in the name of We the People—will provide bulwarks against 
betrayal or erasure by the Roberts Court. Again, Ackerman wants to establish the Civil 
                                                          
 105. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part) (stating that the people may legislate restrictions on abortion because “the Constitution 
says absolutely nothing about it”); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (stating that the legislature may decline to honor a patient’s wish not to have certain measures taken 
to preserve her life because “the Constitution says nothing about the matter”). 
 106. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 16, 311. 
 107. See e.g., SCALIA, supra note 34, at 40-41 (“rot”); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE 
THE CONSTITUTION (2006) (“rewriting”). 
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Rights Revolution as a constitutional revolution—not merely some ordinary, though im-
portant, statutory developments and judicial decisions. The upshot is that the Civil Rights 
Revolution may not be repealed or erased by ordinary lawmaking or ordinary judicial de-
cisions. Instead, a President, Congress, or Supreme Court determined to repeal it would 
have to go through the elaborate six-stage process of higher lawmaking. Thus, his theory 
of fidelity to the living constitution provides greater bulwarks against betrayal or erasure 
than do other theories. 
But, if I learned anything from reading Ackerman’s book (as well as the two previ-
ous volumes), it is that there is no sure bulwark that can preserve progressive changes from 
erasure by determined defenders of older constitutional orders. Not changes through the 
formal amending procedures of Article V: just consider Ackerman’s chilling analysis of 
how the Supreme Court promptly erased the First Reconstruction in Slaughter-House and 
Civil Rights Cases.108 Thus, Ackerman acknowledges that not even formal amendments to 
the Constitution ostensibly adopted through Article V are secure against erasure or be-
trayal. Why should we expect anything different with respect to functional equivalents of 
constitutional amendments outside Article V through his stages of higher lawmaking? 
Even now the Roberts Court is erasing the progressive changes wrought by the New Deal 
and the Civil Rights Revolution. 
Thus, even if the Civil Rights Revolution does rise to the level of higher lawmaking 
changing the Constitution, that would not be a sufficient bulwark to preserve change and 
prevent erasure—any more than the Reconstruction Amendments were a sufficient bul-
wark to realize change and avoid erasure. Neither formal amendment nor the functional 
equivalent thereof can protect us against erasure or betrayal when movement judges are 
determined to obliterate the achievements of a constitutional regime. Again, what Acker-
man presents as achievements, they view as rot or rewriting. They want, as the slogans go, 
to take their Constitution and their country back. They will do this by invalidating the 
statutes, overruling or reinterpreting the precedents, or reinterpreting the amendments. 
They will deny that the new developments Ackerman calls achievements—e.g., the with-
ering away of the requirement of state action and the idea that state autonomy limits na-
tional powers—really changed anything. Or, if those developments did, they are unconsti-
tutional and must be repudiated. As Randy Barnett put it, he aims to “restor[e] the lost 
constitution.”109 
Balkin and I appreciate this—and Dworkin certainly did—about the struggle with 
conservative originalists. We understand that we have to engage in substantive moral ar-
guments about which interpretations best fit and justify our constitutional text, history, 
tradition, and practice—to elaborate a moral reading of the Constitution. Ackerman im-
plicitly understands this, but in places he presents himself as a living constitutionalist his-
toricist who is simply putting forward an historical narrative that fits the historical facts 
and who, as such, seems to resist the moral reading. 
                                                          
 108. Id. at 31, 150-51, 209, 213, 214, 329. 
 109. RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 357 (2004). 
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V. RECASTING ACKERMAN’S LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AS A MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
It is commonplace for living constitutionalists to pit originalism against the moral 
reading and then to say that they are closer to originalists than to moral readers. Balkin did 
this in defending his “living originalism.”110 So does Ackerman. On the one hand, Acker-
man criticizes conventional originalists like Scalia. On the other hand, he distances himself 
from moral readers like Dworkin. Then he says he is “closer to Justice Scalia than to Pro-
fessor Ronald Dworkin.”111 Yet clearly, Ackerman is much closer to Dworkin than to 
Scalia. His account of the substantive principles of the Civil Rights Revolution (even if 
not his full apparatus of popular sovereignty) would be embraced by Dworkin and rejected 
by Scalia. 
Why does Ackerman say he is closer to Scalia than to Dworkin? More generally, 
why does he resist the moral reading? In prior work, I have suggested several reasons, 
including the “turn to history” and the “democratic turn” in liberal constitutional theory.112 
By the “turn to history,” I mean that he presents his theory as rooted in historicism rather 
than in normative political philosophy.113 In distancing himself from Dworkin, and saying 
he is closer to Scalia, Ackerman clearly aims to establish his historicist credentials—the 
historical fit of his living constitutionalist enterprise with our constitutional practice—
while implying that moral readers like Dworkin are ahistorical philosophers who read their 
own vision of political utopia into the Constitution.114 By the “democratic turn,” I mean 
that he presents his theory as the expression of popular sovereignty rather than of courts 
articulating abstract commitments in “the forum of principle.” In criticizing Dworkin’s 
idea that courts are “the forum of principle,”115 and in defending a collaborative constitu-
tionalism, Ackerman plainly aims to demonstrate his democratic credentials—while sug-
gesting that moral readers like Dworkin are court-lovers who disparage our practice of 
popular sovereignty. 
In both instances, I believe Ackerman is using Dworkin as a rhetorical foil to deflect 
common criticisms of liberal constitutional theory in general and living constitutionalism 
in particular. In the “turn to fit,” he is saying that he looks to our history and practice to 
decide what our constitutional commitments are, not to abstract normative liberal political 
philosophy. He is implying that Dworkin did the latter. He is saying: If you think I am 
reading normative liberal political philosophy into our Constitution, you have got the 
wrong person. You want Dworkin, not me. He thus stresses that his account is historicist, 
not philosophical: that is what he means when he says he is closer to Scalia than to 
Dworkin. In the democratic turn, Ackerman is saying that he believes in a collaborative 
model of popular sovereignty, whereby the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court 
ultimately speak in the name of We the People, not a court-centered “forum of principle” 
that merely speaks in the name of We the Judges. He also is saying: If you think I have a 
                                                          
 110. See James E. Fleming, The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 679-80 (analyzing 
Balkin’s rhetorical strategy in differentiating his position from the moral reading of Dworkin). 
 111. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 35. 
 112. Fleming, supra note 41, at 1345-53. 
 113. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 34-35, 71. 
 114. Fleming, supra note 41, at 1345-51. 
 115. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 160, 170. 
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court-centered theory of living constitutionalism that advocates “judicial updating” of the 
Constitution, you have got the wrong person. That person is Dworkin, not me. In this way, 
he emphasizes that the democratic/popular sovereignty credentials of his theory are supe-
rior to those of Dworkin’s moral reading (and, for that matter, Scalia’s originalism). 
But we should not be fooled into thinking that Ackerman is just a historicist who is 
unpacking the commitments that happened to be adopted by a certain people at a certain 
time and in a certain place, working through certain procedures that he has described in a 
legal positivist spirit. In the New Deal or the Civil Rights Revolution, We the People were 
not discovering or elaborating historicist facts about the original meanings of the Consti-
tution or the developments of our constitutional practice. We the People were building out 
our constitutional commitments through normative judgments in the crucible of experi-
ence. What was going on in hammering out these functional equivalents of a constitutional 
amendment other than the realization of a moral reading of the Constitution’s commit-
ments? Surely it was not the realization of historicist facts concerning original meanings 
or political and doctrinal developments. 
Putting aside the rhetorical maneuvering regarding Scalia and Dworkin, Ackerman 
is arguing that his account better fits our constitutional practice, as it has developed over 
time, than do competing accounts. He also is saying that it offers a normatively superior 
understanding both of popular sovereignty and of our substantive constitutional commit-
ments themselves. To put it in Dworkin’s famous formulation of the two dimensions of 
the best interpretation116: Ackerman is claiming that his account provides the best fit with 
and justification of our constitutional practice. That is why I have argued for recasting his 
living constitutionalism as a moral reading of the Constitution. Again, through his rhetor-
ical move of claiming to be closer to Scalia than to Dworkin, Ackerman demonstrates that 
even some living constitutionalist critics of originalism are in the grip of the “originalist 
premise”—the premise or assumption that the best understanding of fidelity (here, to our 
constitutional practice, not to original meanings) is necessarily originalist.117 But, I have 
argued, the aspiration to fidelity to our living constitution as Ackerman conceives it is the 
aspiration of a moral reading, not an originalism. 
These rhetorical strategies and deflections are certainly understandable. Nonethe-
less, I shall suggest that Ackerman’s living constitutionalism is illuminatingly understood 
as a moral reading of the Constitution (in a general sense, if not in Dworkin’s specific 
sense), not merely a historicist account of our constitutional development. 
I mean a moral reading in two basic senses. First, Ackerman’s theory is a moral 
reading in the sense that, under it, faithful interpretation requires normative judgments 
about the best understanding of our constitutional commitments as we have built them out 
over time. Ackerman conceives the Constitution as a scheme of normative commitments, 
not historicist facts. This comes out most clearly in his criticism of Justice White’s opinion 
in McLaughlin v. Florida for stating that the meaning and central purpose of the Equal 
Protection Clause is a “historical fact.”118 Although Ackerman says his account is histori-
cist, he is making an argument about what normative constitutional commitments were 
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hammered out in the Civil Rights Revolution. He clearly understands that those commit-
ments are not simply discovered as historicist facts through historical research. To decide 
what they are, Ackerman has to make interpretations requiring normative judgments. He 
also makes clear that interpreting and applying those commitments—“redeeming” them, 
as he sometimes says—requires normative judgments, not just marshaling historical facts. 
Ackerman half disguises this point in speaking of Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in 
Brown as embodying a “sociological jurisprudence” or requiring “situation sense”119—
that it requires making common sense judgments about whether real world practices in 
certain contexts manifest “institutionalized humiliation” so as to deny equal protection.120 
I say “half disguises,” because “sociological jurisprudence” may not sound like normative 
moral judgments. For that matter, “situation sense” or common sense may not sound like 
normative moral judgments either. To be sure, they are not the normative moral judgments 
of abstract political philosophy. But they are normative moral judgments about the social 
meaning of laws and practices—whether they embody institutionalized humiliation and 
deny dignity. More generally, elaboration of Brown’s “anti-humiliation principle”121 and 
application of its “logic of spheres”122 will require normative moral judgments concerning 
what practices, in what contexts, humiliate and deny dignity. Moreover, his development 
of the meaning of popular sovereignty in our constitutional practice will require normative 
judgments. Indeed, all of Ackerman’s judgments about what holdings are faithful to the 
New Deal and Civil Rights Revolution and what holdings betray them will require norma-
tive judgments. None of these matters can be decided as a matter of historicist fact. In 
short, Ackerman’s living constitutionalism will require complex normative judgments; ac-
cordingly, it will be a moral reading of the Constitution. 
Second, Ackerman’s theory is also a moral reading in the sense that he believes we 
must adopt and apply it if we are to make the Constitution the best it can be (to recall 
Dworkin’s famous formulation)123 or redeem its promises (to invoke Balkin’s formula-
tion).124 Ackerman contends that “the possibility of popular sovereignty” under our Con-
stitution depends upon our accepting his theory of unconventional adaptation and trans-
formation outside Article V.125 
What does he mean by this claim? He seems to be making both a justificatory claim 
and a hortatory claim. The justificatory claim is that our Constitution—notwithstanding 
the text of Article V in the Constitution itself—presupposes a theory of popular sover-
eignty in light of which Article V is incomplete, a compromise, or even a mistake (if it 
purports to prescribe the exclusive procedures for making higher law). Therefore, in order 
for the Constitution to be able to realize its commitment to popular sovereignty, and indeed 
for it to be legitimate, We the People must be free to amend and transform it outside the 
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formal procedures of Article V, including through the model of transformation that Acker-
man develops. Otherwise, we are not a properly self-governing People. 
The hortatory claim is that We the People are more likely to live up to the rights and 
responsibilities of self-government if we believe that the People, as recently as the New 
Deal and Civil Rights Revolution, rose to the occasion of transforming the higher law of 
the Constitution. After all, if We the People have done so only once (or perhaps twice) in 
American history, and not since the Founding (or possibly Reconstruction) at that, what is 
the hope of the People accomplishing anything great by way of higher lawmaking in our 
time? Other theories, including those of Article V exclusivity, denigrate the constitutional 
creativity of We the People, and thus may demoralize or debilitate the People, undermining 
the possibility of popular sovereignty. 
Through advancing the idea that “the possibility of popular sovereignty” requires us 
to supplement or even override Article V, Ackerman proves to be a popular sovereignty-
perfecting theorist.126 That is, he is arguing that the Constitution presupposes a theory of 
popular sovereignty in light of which Article V—evidently a fixed point or foundational 
text—can be seen to be incomplete, a compromise, or even a mistake. And he is arguing 
for interpreting the Constitution so as to perfect it from the standpoint of his theory of 
popular sovereignty, even to the point of supplementing or overriding provisions of its 
text. In terms of Dworkin’s well-known formulations, Ackerman is calling for interpreting 
the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be and putting forward a moral reading of 
the Constitution. 
VI. CONCLUSION: RECONCEIVING THE MORAL READING AS A BIG TENT 
THAT INCLUDES ACKERMAN’S LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 
In my essay in the Fordham symposium on “Fidelity in Constitutional Theory,” I 
applauded Ackerman for developing a conception of fidelity in constitutional interpreta-
tion that is an alternative to that of conventional originalists. But I criticized him for re-
sisting the moral reading. I argued that we should conceive the moral reading as a big tent 
that can encompass broad originalist, living originalist, or living constitutionalist concep-
tions such as those developed by Ackerman and Balkin. I urged Ackerman as well as Bal-
kin to reconceive his project as being in support of a moral reading, not as offering an 
alternative to it. For constitutional theorists like Ackerman and Balkin can provide firmer 
ground than Dworkin has offered for the moral reading in fit with historical materials and 
our constitutional practice.127 
We should conceive Ackerman as developing a moral reading (in a general sense, 
not Dworkin’s specific sense), not merely a historicist reading. And we should 
acknowledge that he has provided an account that splendidly fits with and justifies our 
constitutional practice, with all its imperfections. He has put forward an account of a living 
constitution that is worthy of our fidelity. It deserves not to be betrayed or erased by 
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Scalia’s and Thomas’s originalism, the “judicial battering ram for obliterating the achieve-
ments of the twentieth century”128 and for thwarting the progress of the twenty-first cen-
tury. We need moral readings of the Constitution for the twenty-first century that can offer 
hope and provide effective tools for resisting and even overcoming such originalist batter-
ing, and Ackerman has provided a powerful, imaginative, and magnificent one. 
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